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Rights adjudication and
constitutional pluralism in Germany
and Europe
Alec Stone Sweet and Kathleen Stranz
ABSTRACT The development of a corpus of fundamental rights at the EU level
has accentuated the constitutional pluralism that existed within many national legal
systems. Illustrating the dynamic, the adjudication of the age discrimination
provisions of the 2000 Framework Directive on Employment Equality in
Germany produced two major outcomes. First, interactions between the ECJ and
the German labour courts served to upgrade rights protections afforded to
workers, relative to national constitutional standards. Second, the structural position
of the German Federal Constitutional Court, as a privileged locus of rights protec-
tion, was weakened, while the authority of the labour courts was enhanced. Looking
ahead, we are entering a new era of rights-based legal integration that will further
serve to Europeanize national law, while undermining the (supposed) unity and
coherence of national legal orders.
KEY WORDS Constitutional pluralism; European Court of Justice;
Europeanization; labour law; legal integration; non-discrimination.
INTRODUCTION
This article builds on two strains of research on the European Court of Justice
(ECJ) and legal integration.1 The first tracks and evaluates the impact of the
ECJ’s case law on market and political integration. The scholarship has conclu-
sively shown that the legal system of the European Union (EU) has pushed inte-
gration further than member states were prepared to go on their own, under
extant decision-rules, provoking a process of adaptation on the part of EU legis-
lators and national officials (Cichowski 2007; Mattli and Slaughter 1998; Stone
Sweet 2004). A second strain has documented the interactions of the ECJ and
the national courts (Alter 2001; Nyikos 2003; Panke 2007), processes resulting
in the gradual ‘Europeanization’ of national legal orders. Our focus here is on
the judicial politics of rights protection, specifically on how German courts
and the ECJ have interacted to create and enforce a right to be free from
discrimination in the workplace.
The case study is important in its own right. Adjudicating the 2000 Framework
EU Directive on Employment Equality produced two linked outcomes. First, it
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consolidated the rights-based, ‘constitutional pluralism’ that characterizes the
German legal system. By ‘constitutional pluralism’, we refer to a situation,
within the domestic legal system, in which two or more sources of judicially
enforceable rights, occupying a rank above statute, co-exist.2 Second, private liti-
gants, German labour judges, and the ECJ leveraged EU fundamental rights to
upgrade German standards of rights protection to a higher, European level, mar-
ginalizing the German Federal Constitutional Court (GFCC) in the process.
The wider significance of the case also deserves emphasis. Kelemen (2011) has
demonstrated that the importance of the ECJ and the national courts broadly
expanded as the EU’s legislative bodies (post-Single European Act) embraced
a rights-based, court-centric system for monitoring and enforcing member
state compliance with EU secondary law. This contribution provides further
empirical support for Kelemen’s arguments. With respect to the themes devel-
oped by the editors of this collection (Kelemen and Schmidt 2012), we do not
see the importance of the ECJ and the national courts declining in the near
future. On the contrary, the expansion of broad judicial review powers in the
service of rights protection will reinforce the legal system’s capacity to control
outcomes.
The case study we present is embedded in crucial legal developments that
have taken place over the past four decades (Bell 2011). In the 1970s and
1980s, the ECJ developed a general principle of equality – in the guise of a
fundamental right to be free of discrimination – through its rulings on equal
pay and equal treatment of the sexes. By the end of the 1990s, the Court’s jur-
isprudence on non-discrimination had thoroughly ‘judicialized’ EU law-making
in the area, all but requiring the EU’s legislative organs to codify the Court’s
major rulings as entrenched secondary law (Cichowski 2001). These rulings
also opened up new domains of national policy to the reach of EU law
through national judges. Most important, they obliged national courts to super-
vise workplace rules and practices, that is, private contractual relations. A new
wave of activity began in 2000, when the EU legislator initiated a series of
rights-based secondary legislation that, in effect, codified the (in part, unwrit-
ten) general principle of equality that the Court had elaborated. The most
important of these statutes is Directive 2000/78 – ‘establishing a general frame-
work for equal treatment in employment and occupation’. In Mangold (C-144/
04), a momentous 2005 ruling, the ECJ ‘constitutionalized’ the provisions of
the Directive related to age discrimination, by holding that the Directive’s
main features expressed norms that already existed as (unwritten) EU funda-
mental rights. The Mangold saga heralds a new generation of inter-court, judi-
cial politics that will heavily condition how the European system of rights
protection will evolve.
The contribution is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of
how EU equality law had developed prior to the Mangold ruling. We then
(3) discuss long-standing tensions within German law, as embodied in the dif-
fering approaches of the German Federal Labour Court (GFLC) and the GFCC
to the application of rights in disputes between private parties. Section 4 focuses
































on the Mangold litigation and its consequences. As Sections 2–4 show, the
development of EU equality law undermined the autonomy of the national
legal order, while enhancing constitutional pluralism within Germany. In the
conclusion (5), we argue that the distinctive architecture of rights-based consti-
tutionalism in Europe, coupled with the EU’s turn toward combating discrimi-
nation will further undermine the (supposed) unity and coherence of national
legal orders, while bolstering the importance of the relationship between the
ECJ and the national courts.
THE ECJ AND THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF NON-
DISCRIMINATION
Beginning in the late 1970s, the ECJ began to ‘constitutionalize’ the notion of
sex equality. In Defrenne II (43/75), the Court recognized the direct effect of
ex-Art. 119 EC (now Art. 157 TFEU), which obliges the member states to
ensure that men and women receive ‘equal pay for equal work’, thus converting
that provision into a right that individuals could ask national courts to enforce.
Over two decades, the scope of this right steadily expanded to include much
more than salary and wages. During this same period, the Court also developed
the ‘general principle of equality’ from two sources: ex-Art. 119 EC and the
1976 Equal Treatment Directive. Gradually, a justification for this jurispru-
dence emerged. The EU, the Court stressed, was not just an economic associ-
ation to be legitimated through efficiency-based rationales. It was also a social
community, whose duty it was to mitigate at least some of the injustices gener-
ated in market and workplace relations.
As scholars have extensively documented (Bell 2011; Ellis 1998, 2005; Stone
Sweet 2004: ch. 4), the constitutionalization of sex equality made the courts the
site of normative innovation, largely eclipsing legislative authority at both the
EU and national levels. The Commission leveraged the ECJ’s rulings, using
them as templates for new EU statutes, including directives on indirect discrimi-
nation (1997), occupational social security (1986) and pregnancy and maternity
(1996). The general outcome – recurrent codification of the Court’s progressive
case law – flows in part from the fact that the ECJ treated the norm of non-dis-
crimination as a fundamental right, conferring upon it a higher-law position
within the structure of EU law.
For present purposes, the ‘constitutionalization of the principle of non-dis-
crimination’ refers to several overlapping features of equality law.3 A first con-
cerns legal sources. In 1980, it could be assumed that a discrete piece of
secondary legislation, the 1978 Equal Treatment Directive, comprised the
source of the principle of equal treatment of the sexes, and that ex-Art. 119 EC
originated the rule that men and women must receive equal pay for equal
work. By the end of the 1990s, the Court had made it clear that these texts
expressed norms of equality and non-discrimination which could also be found
in the (judge-made) general principles of EU law. A second feature relates to
the procedure through which the member states, or governments, may override
































the Court’s jurisprudence in this area. Normally, an unwanted interpretation of a
treaty provision or a statute may be overridden, respectively, through treaty revi-
sion (by a unanimous vote of the member states) or statutory amendment (in this
domain, the override rule would be a unanimous vote on the part of governments
acting in the Council of Ministers). It is not at all clear, however, how the member
states could override the Court’s case law on fundamental rights (the general prin-
ciples), even if they could muster consensus. A third characteristic of the principle
of equality must also be stressed. As a fundamental right, it is imbued with both
vertical and horizontal direct effect, a point that warrants further discussion.
In the 1960s, the Court famously initiated its ‘constitutional’ jurisprudence of
direct effect and supremacy (Mancini 1989) which, as national courts adapted
to it, would gradually but inexorably ‘transform’ the EU (Weiler 1991), feder-
alizing the regime in all but name (Lenaerts 1990). Treaty provisions and direc-
tives that meet certain criteria are directly effective; that is, private parties may
plead them at national bar. The central purpose of such litigation is to provoke
judicial scrutiny of member state compliance with EU law. Individuals, firms
and groups generate the case load; the preliminary reference procedure (gov-
erned by Art. 267 TFEU) organizes a dialogue between the ECJ and the
national courts on issues concerning the conformity of national law to EU
Law; and, under the doctrine of supremacy, the national judge must set aside
(disapply) any national legal rule or practice that conflicts with EU law. In
areas governed by direct effect and supremacy, national judges are expected to
act as agents of the EU legal order, not the national order.
The ECJ took an aggressive stance with respect to the vertical direct effect of EU
law, which refers to the immediate judicial applicability of EU law to disputes
between (a) private parties and (b) national organs of government. As the
Court has consistently stressed, direct effect constitutes a mechanism for enhan-
cing ‘the effectiveness’ of EU law within national legal orders. The doctrine has
been central to market-building through ‘negative integration’, the judicially led
process through which barriers to intra-EU trade in goods and services, labour
flows and investment are removed (see Schmidt 2012). When adjudicating
cases involving one of the ‘four freedoms’, vertical direct effect was enough.
The Court’s position on the horizontal direct effect of EU law, which refers to
the applicability of EU law to relations between two private persons or entities,
was more nuanced. In Defrenne II, the Court opened the door to horizontal direct
effect, holding that, under the Treaty, employers could not operate systems of
remuneration that discriminated on the basis of sex. By virtue of the direct
effect of ex-Art. 119 EC, employees may bring suit against employers before
national judges, thereby triggering judicial review of the firm’s workplace pol-
icies, as well as the national law that would permit such policies. Adjudicating
disputes under EU law that is applicable between private parties inevitably impli-
cates judges in ‘positive integration’, the process through which EU law, designed
to replace disparate national regulation, is made and applied. Somewhat contro-
versially (Prechal 1995), the ECJ has balked at conferring horizontal direct effect
































on directives that member states had either failed to transpose into national law,
or had transposed incorrectly.4
Here, again, we encounter features of legal doctrine that are crucial to our
analysis. Most important, the general principles, including fundamental
rights, enjoy at least the rank of Treaty law in the hierarchy of legal norms of
the EU. The Court, therefore, can recognize the horizontal direct effect of a fun-
damental right. In the domain of sex equality, the ECJ has on several occasions
held that norms found in EU statutes simply reflect a higher-law norm
embedded in the general principles. When it does so, statutory law is effectively
‘constitutionalized’, and horizontal direct effect kicks in. Thus, while the ECJ
constrained the reach of judicial authority in denying the horizontal direct
effect of directives, it may overcome this constraint through determining that
a fundamental right is in play. If, from the perspective of the ECJ’s ‘consti-
tutional’ jurisprudence, national courts are agents of the EU legal order every
time they adjudicate disputes in domains governed by EU law, then a crucial
point follows. Once the Court decides that an EU legal norm is possessed of
horizontal direct effect, by virtue of its relationship to a fundamental right,
national constitutional rights and the jurisprudence of national constitutional
courts are no longer dispositive.
The question of whether national judges actually conform to the role that the
ECJ has imagined for them – as faithful ‘agents’ of EU law – is not merely a
doctrinal question but a deeply political one. After all, national judges may con-
sider themselves to be, first and foremost, agents of the national legal order;
national rights jurisprudence may dictate outcomes that the ECJ, under the
supremacy doctrine, would require them to abandon; and the ECJ has no
direct means to compel national courts to comply with its rulings. As an empiri-
cal matter, the question will be settled on the basis of choices made by specific
national judges in specific cases. The ECJ’s equality jurisprudence broke new
ground;5 indeed, it has been transformative. Outside of EU law, for example,
the concept of indirect sex discrimination per se was unknown in the law of
the member states.6 Some national judges were initially reticent about adjudi-
cating such cases, and some initially rejected the (alien) doctrinal framework
that the Court developed to deal with claims of indirect discrimination, a
version of an intrusive form of scrutiny called proportionality analysis. Gradually,
however, judges did adapt to the Court’s case law with wide-ranging conse-
quences for national conceptions of equality and discrimination that are still
being worked out.
Member states governments too adapted: they ratified the Court’s moves,
codifying the Court’s case law in directives (Stone Sweet 2004: 159–70).
The doctrinal framework governing the adjudication of indirect discrimination,
for example, is found (copied virtually word-for-word) in a provision of the
1997 directive on the matter, further facilitating its diffusion within national
orders. In 1999 (Treaty of Amsterdam), the member states provided legal
basis for legislation serving to combat discrimination (now Art. 19.1 TFEU),
upon the unanimous vote of the Council with the consent of the Parliament.
































In 2000, legislators adopted the Framework Directive on Employment
Equality (2000/78/EC), part of a ‘suite’ of ‘secondary rights legislation’ that
would soon appear (Bell 2011). The Directive prohibits discrimination in
employment, benefits and work conditions based on age, disability, religion,
belief and sexual orientation. The legislation explicitly references the Court’s
established case law; it covers both direct and indirect discrimination, as well
as harassment; and it is directly applicable, upon transposition, both vertically
and horizontally. With the Framework Directive, the EU’s legislative branch
had harnessed judicial authority to make the principle of non-discrimination
effective at the level of the workplace. Indeed, it made obligatory the ECJ’s
preferred methodology: proportionality analysis of any public interest or econ-
omic justification that would infringe upon the principle of non-discrimination.
Proportionality analysis involves least-restrictive means testing and balancing
(discussed further below); adopting it constitutes, in effect, a rejection of judicial
deference to political or economic decision-makers in favour of a strict form of
review (Stone Sweet and Mathews 2008).
In sum, the Directive provided the basis for a significant incursion of EU law
into national law and workplace practices. Unavoidably, national judges would
be faced with deep, structural choices about the nature of and scope of the auth-
ority of the EU and of the ECJ. In the next two sections, we focus on how
German courts have made these choices, with what systemic consequences.
RIGHTS PLURALISM IN GERMANY
When it comes to rights protection under the Basic Law, the German legal order
is characterized by a structural condition: constitutional pluralism (defined
above).7 Perhaps contentiously, we do not view the German legal order as a
unified normative system, or German rights doctrine as coherent. In many
EU member states (Stone Sweet 2009), rights-based pluralism means that
two or more high courts, with respect to the same litigants (or class of litigants),
can claim authority to resolve legal disputes about the scope, content and appli-
cability of a right, and no single high court can directly impose its authority on
the other(s). In Germany, apart from the GFCC, there are five, autonomous
supreme courts; some of these routinely enforce functionally equivalent rights
provisions under the jurisprudence of the GFCC, the ECJ, and the European
Court of Human Rights; and the mechanism developed to ensure the
GFCC’s control over how the other domestic supreme courts adjudicate
rights claims – the individual constitutional complaint – has proved to be
inadequate when it comes to European law. Moreover, some German courts
self-consciously use the ECJ to enhance their own authority, and to subvert
that of the GFCC (Alter 2001).
In fact, constitutional pluralism emerged in the early years of the Federal
Republic, when the GFLC moved to give horizontal direct effect to the rights
provisions of the Basic Law. To our knowledge, the GFLC was the first court
to do so anywhere in the world. In a series of seminal rulings, the GFLC
































held that rights, including of speech and conscience, marriage, sex equality, and
human dignity and personality, were directly applicable between employees and
employers.8 By 1957, the GFLC could treat the horizontal direct effect of rights
as settled case law.9 The move was controversial. It imported, into the ‘private
law’, norms that were considered to be part of the ‘public law’, obliterating dis-
tinctions many considered to be foundational. In developing this jurisprudence
on its own, without a reference to the GFCC, the GFLC also implicitly denied
the GFCC’s centrality as the fount of rights protection. The outcome, the con-
struction of rights as binding on relations between employers and employees,
was unanticipated by the founders of the Federal Republic (Quint 1989:
252–58).
In 1958, the GFCC reacted, in its celebrated Lüth ruling.10 The GFCC held
that, since the ‘constitutional values’ (now usually called ‘principles’) permeate
‘all spheres of law’, it was the duty of the entire judiciary to ensure the compat-
ibility of ‘every provision of the private law’ with rights. The Court rejected two
‘extreme’ positions: the view that rights are exclusively norms of the public law,
and do not touch the private law; and the position taken by the GFLC on the
horizontal direct effect of rights in employment law. Lüth took a middle road,
standing for the proposition that the rights enumerated in the first chapter of the
Basic Law (Arts. 1–19) are indirectly effective between individuals: in conse-
quence, judges are obliged to interpret the various codes that make up the
private law as if these codes had been written in conformity with rights pro-
visions (as interpreted by the GFCC on an ongoing basis). The Lüth ruling pro-
voked a long series of battles between the GFCC and the Supreme Civil Court
(Bundesgerichtshof), as the GFCC worked to ‘constitutionalize’ the Civil Code,
while civil judges sought to defend their autonomy. The GFLC continued down
its own path, usually managing to stay one step ahead of the GFCC. To circum-
vent the GFCC’s control, for example, the GFLC strengthened what is now
known as the General Clause on Equality, an expansive, unwritten, judge-
made right to be free of discrimination in workplace relations, which the
GFLC had originated prior to Lüth.11 Thus, significant constitutional pluralism
existed in Germany prior to the advent of the ECJ’s equality jurisprudence.
Unlike the GFLC, the Constitutional Court had chosen not to give equality a
privileged status (Fuchsloch 1995; Kokott 1995). Art. 3.1 of the Basic Law com-
prises a general equal treatment clause; Art. 3.2 provides equal rights between
women and men; and Art. 3.3 prohibits discrimination on the grounds of
sex, parentage, race, language, homeland and origin, faith, or religious or politi-
cal opinions, and disability. Until the 1980s, the GFCC gave these provisions a
narrow scope when compared to protections conferred on other freedoms. Gen-
erally, the GFCC deploys a robust, three-step proportionality test when it adju-
dicates rights claims. When it came to Art. 3, however, the GFCC developed a
more deferential level of scrutiny akin to what Americans would call ‘rational
basis’ review. Under a full proportionality analysis, a court reviews an act or
measure to ensure that (1) the means selected to achieve a purpose are ‘suitable’
to achieving that purpose (a suitability test); (2) the means chosen do not
































infringe upon the right more than is ‘necessary’ (a ‘necessity’ or least-restrictive
means test); and (3) the cost of the measure – infringement on the right – is
outweighed by the benefits of the measure under review (a residual ‘balancing’
test). The GFCC afforded the legislator wide discretion for making distinctions
within categories falling under Arts. 3.2 and 3.3, in effect, stopping the analysis
after step 1. Furthermore, the GFCC did not recognize indirect discrimination.
With regard to sex equality, for example, the German constitution covered only
discrimination that resulted from measures that overtly or intentionally treated
men and women differently.
Abetted by German judges, the ECJ’s equality case law fatally undermined the
GFCC’s position. German labour courts supplied the references to the ECJ in
two foundational cases: Bilka (170/84) and Rinner-Kühn (C-171/88). These
cases concerned the lawfulness of policies that denied part-time employees
benefits afforded to full-time workers (pensions and sick-leave respectively), in
situations in which women comprised the vast majority of the part-time
labour force. In their references, German judges made it clear that they con-
sidered these practices, and the national statutes that permitted them, to be a
form of indirect sex discrimination, and therefore unlawful under ex-Art. 119
EC. The ECJ responded by giving the referring courts what they wanted: a
mandate to root out indirect discrimination in the workplace and in Germany’s
social policies. Further, because the right inheres in ex-Art. 119, the Court recog-
nized its horizontal direct effect; employees could henceforth plead it directly
against employers before national judges. As important, the ECJ insisted that
judges use a full-blooded proportionality test to adjudicate such claims,
whereas German judges would not be able to do so under the doctrines of the
GFCC. In its final judgment in the Bilka saga (1986), the GFLC applied the
ECJ’s ruling to resolve the case.12 The GFLC then began to invoke Art. 157
TFEU (ex-Art. 119 EC) as the source of the right, not the Basic Law, thereby
marginalizing the GFCC.
The GFCC ruled on the case six years later, in 1992, pursuant to a consti-
tutional complaint brought by the Bilka Department store, the loser in the
case, attacking the GFLC’s ruling as unconstitutional. The company claimed
that the GFLC and the ECJ had struck the wrong balance, in that they under-
valued the economic burdens to employers, while ignoring settled German con-
stitutional case law. The GFCC rejected these arguments, in effect deferring to
the ECJ.13 In 1997, more than a decade after Bilka had been decided, the
GFCC adopted the ECJ’s framework as its own approach to indirect discrimi-
nation under Art. 3.2 of the Basic Law, citing the GFLC’s and the ECJ’s case law
in the process.14 In this episode, the ECJ and the German labour courts
enhanced their status as rights-protecting courts, and they enhanced rights pro-
tection for German women. The GFCC, left behind and on the sidelines,
changed its own rights jurisprudence in an effort to re-establish relevance.
With this background in mind, we turn to how age discrimination was
addressed by German courts prior to the adjudication of the 2000 Framework
Directive. German constitutional law does not expressly prohibit age
































discrimination. In the employment context, when the GFCC was asked to
review the constitutionality of statutes that treated persons differently with refer-
ence to their age, it would review these provisions under Art. 12 Basic Law
(freedom of occupation), treating Art. 3.1 as a supplementary, residual criterion.
Only in cases not covered by Art. 12 or some other enumerated freedom, would
the Court analyse a claim under the equality or non-discrimination heading
(Art. 3 Basic Law) in a first stage. As noted above, this jurisprudence has con-
sequences for the deference given by the GFCC to legislative authority. The
GFCC applies proportionality analysis to most of the enumerated freedoms,
but deploys a deferential, ‘reasonableness’ test to equality claims under Art. 3
Basic Law. In practical terms, this meant that the GFCC would almost never
find a violation of the equality clause unless an enumerated freedom had also
been violated. This case law has remained remarkably consistent since the late
1950s. The GFLC, on the other hand, had recognized an autonomous action
for age discrimination in private contractual agreements since at least the 1980s.
In summary, when it came to protecting employees from discrimination, the
GFLC’s posture toward equality was open to EU law and flexible. Recall that it
had embraced the horizontal direct effect of rights, before the GFCC sought to
stifle that development in Lüth. Under its own jurisprudence, the GFLC con-
tinued to blend analysis under the General Clause and the Basic Law, balancing
both against, say, the right to contract claimed by the employer. After Bilka and
Rinner-Kühn, the GFLC could simply reference the ECJ’s jurisprudence, while
implicitly rejecting the GFCC’s case law. Put differently, the ECJ’s key rulings
in the area strengthened what labour judges were already pre-disposed to do.15
The GFCC, on the other hand, had painted itself into a doctrinal corner,
making it appear insular and defensive. The 2000 Framework Directive
would lay bare these tensions. Since the Directive prohibits, among other
things, age discrimination in both its direct and indirect forms, and it applies
to both the public and private sectors, the German legal order would be
forced to adapt in deep, structural ways. The question was not if, but how, it
would adapt.
4. THE MANGOLD CASE AND ITS IMPACT
In 2005, the ECJ issued its first ruling on the Framework Directive’s provisions
on age discrimination, pursuant to a reference sent by Judge Hauf, sitting on the
Munich Labour Court of first instance. The case involved the employment of a
lawyer, Mr Mangold, by another lawyer, Mr Held, to a fixed-term contract
under conditions provided by federal statute governing part-time and fixed
contract employment. The statute had been amended in 2003, to relax
certain protections for employees, aged 52 and over, from dismissal. The
alleged purpose of the statute was to facilitate the hiring of older workers.
Mr Held had been an opponent of the 2003 amendment, on discrimination
grounds, and had urged legislators to reject the amendment before the Bundes-
tag. The proceedings established that Held had hired Mr Mangold for the
































express purpose of challenging the law in the courts,16 but Judge Hauf set these
objections aside, asserting authority to review the legality of the statute.
Although the case raises a wide range of technical matters, we focus here on
the major ‘constitutional’ issues.
Judge Hauf, whose antipathy for the statute was undisguised, faced several
hurdles. Most important, the German statute under review had been
amended prior to the deadline for transposing the Framework Directive into
German law, and the government and the legislature were dragging their feet.
EU directives, recall, are not possessed of horizontal direct effect. Further, the
ECJ’s doctrine of ‘indirect effect’, which requires judges to interpret national
law with reference to EU law in order to make it effective, would only kick
in once the transposition period had expired; and, in any event, age 52 was a
rule that afforded no interpretive wiggle room. To make matters more
complex, the German statute appeared to be compatible with the only pertinent
EU legislation on the books, EU Directive 1999/70 on fixed-contract work,
which does not address age discrimination.
In a wide-ranging reference, Judge Hauf sought to persuade the ECJ that the
German statute was unlawful under EU law.17 She began by pointing out that,
in Germany, fixed-term-contract provisions had long been subject to constraints
grounded in judicial precedent, including the rule that objective reasons must be
given for limiting employment protection under such contracts, whereas the
2003 amendment did not require such justification when hiring workers
aged 52 and over. Next, referencing the scholarly literature, which is far more
contested than her portrayal would suggest,18 Judge Hauf indicated that the
German provisions probably violated the Framework Directive with respect
to age discrimination. More important, she argued that the case was covered
by EU fundamental rights, including provisions of the EU’s Charter of
Rights (then not in force): Art. 30 of the Charter announces a right to protection
against unjustified dismissals; and Art. 21 prohibits age discrimination. Judge
Hauf did not base her arguments on the Framework Directive, in part
because the Directive had yet to be transposed into German law, and in
part because she was seeking to constitutionalize the prohibition of age
discrimination.
The ECJ, rejecting a more cautious approach urged by its Advocate-General,
ruled that the question was governed by the general principle of equality, which
included a right to non-discrimination on the basis of age. In framing the ruling
in this way, the Court could circumvent the problem of horizontal direct
effect, by basing its decision on fundamental rights,19 not the Directive.
Taking its cues from Judge Hauf, the Court held that the German provision
under review discriminated against older employees, and that this harm could
not be justified under the proportionality test required by Art. 6 of the Directive
(which is itself based on the ECJ’s equality jurisprudence). Because the national
legislation fell within the scope of EU Law (through Directive 1999/70), the
national judge is an agent of the EU legal order, authorized to ‘provide all
the criteria of interpretation needed . . . to determine whether [national] rules
































are compatible with such a principle’. The ECJ then gave Judge Hauf what she
wanted, authorization to enforce EU fundamental rights against the national
rule under review.
The Mangold decision provoked a storm of protest.20 Most notably, the
former president of both the GFCC and the Federal Republic, Roman
Herzog, attacked the Court in a public, frontal assault. In 2008, Herzog and
his colleague, Lüder Gerken, published an article in the Frankfurter Allgemeine
Zeitung entitled: ‘Stoppt den Europäischen Gerichtshof’ (Stop the ECJ). The
Court’s move to general principles was characterized as an ultra vires act
under the criteria laid down by the GFCC in its famous ruling on the Maas-
tricht Treaty.21 In addition, the authors claimed that Mangold violated the con-
stitutional rights of German employers (freedom of contract, freedom of
occupation and the constitutional principle of legal certainty).
In the meantime, the GFLC quickly embraced the new jurisprudence in Hon-
eywell, a case decided six months after the ECJ’s Mangold ruling.22 The facts
were similar to those in Mangold, leading the GFLC to refuse to apply the rel-
evant German provisions. The GFLC also took it upon itself to address the
question of whether Mangold was ultra vires under the German Basic Law,
rejecting the claim on multiple grounds. In doing so, the GFLC had conferred
upon itself what arguably are inherently constitutional functions only to be exer-
cised by the GFCC.
The GFCC ruled on the case four years later, pursuant to an individual com-
plaint brought by the Honeywell Corporation. Observers considered the case to
be a test of the GFCC’s asserted authority to review the ultra vires nature of EU
acts under its Maastricht ruling. A coalition of law professors from diverse
backgrounds published an expert opinion attacking Mangold, and urging the
GFCC to declare the ECJ’s ruling ultra vires (Gerken et al. 2009). The GFCC
dismissed these arguments,23 over the dissent of one justice, thereby avoiding
open conflict with the GFLC and the ECJ.
In our view, the GFCC had little to gain and much to lose in declaring the
ECJ’s Mangold decision invalid under German law. By the time of the
GFCC’s ruling (2010), the EU Charter of Rights had entered into force,
changing at least the symbolic politics of the matter. In addition, the
Mangold ruling had generated a wave of references from the German courts
to the ECJ, interactions which the GFCC could not directly control. Last, to
declare the ECJ’s Mangold ruling ultra vires would be to admit an uncomforta-
ble truth, namely that German standards for protecting fundamental rights were
lower than European standards. The GFCC would then be faced with the
difficult task of forcing the labour courts, which would be strongly supported
by the ECJ, to comply with its ruling.
The ECJ, for its part, appeared to wobble. In its first post-Mangold case on the
issue, Palacios de la Villa (C-411/05), Advocate-General Mazák forcefully
criticized the Mangold ruling, characterizing it as a flight of fancy. The ECJ
found the Spanish law under scrutiny to be justified under the Framework
Directive, eschewing fundamental rights analysis under the general principles.
































In the very next case, Bartsch (C-427/06), brought by the German GFLC, the
Court held that the scope of the equality principle, with respect to age discrimi-
nation, did not extend to cases that have no connection to EU Law. Bartsch is
also of interest in that it produced an opinion by Advocate-General Sharpston,
elaborating ideas that could have significant influence on future developments.
Sharpston advanced an expansive version of the Mangold doctrine, suggesting
that the content of the general principle of non-discrimination would necess-
arily change over time, as society changes. The Court should be prepared to
recognize new forms of discrimination, and seek to combat them on fundamen-
tal rights grounds, Mangold being just one instance in this unfolding process.
In 2010, the ECJ appeared to follow Sharpston’s lead. In Kücükdeveci (C-
555/07), the Higher Labour Court of Düsseldorf asked the ECJ to review
the compatibility of a German Civil Code provision with EU law on age dis-
crimination. Ms Kücükdeveci was employed from the age of 18 by Swedex, a
company that dismissed her after 10 years of service. In calculating the period
of notice owed to Ms Kücükdeveci, Swedex relied on a provision of the
German Civil Code that allowed employers to exclude from consideration
periods of work prior to an employee’s 25th birthday. The plaintiff challenged
the terms of her dismissal before a German labour court, which dismissed the
claim. She appealed on the grounds that the provisions in question constituted
age discrimination, in that she was not credited with work-time corresponding
to her length of service. Labour courts operating in different Länder had pro-
duced contrary rulings on these same Civil Code provisions.24
The Düsseldorf court’s reference to the ECJ expressed discomfort with the
situation. The referral pointed out that, under the German Basic Law, it was
bound by German statutes, and that only the GFCC possessed the authority
to invalidate a German law. It then baldly stated that, given the GFCC’s juris-
prudence, a reference to the GFCC would be unlikely to help Ms Kücükdeveci;
indeed, the referral cited two GFCC decisions upholding the provision in ques-
tion in related cases. Nonetheless, the judges made it clear that they believed that
the part of the Civil Code under review violated the EU’s age discrimination
principle, and could not be justified under the EU’s Framework Directive.
The referring judge then raised a major constitutional question: could any
national court set aside a national norm if it considers that norm to be contrary
to the principle of non-discrimination, or must the national judge be pre-auth-
orized by the ECJ to do so?25
Six member state governments (the Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany,
Ireland, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom) filed briefs or weighed in
at oral argument, an unusually high number. On the major issues, the govern-
ments spoke in one voice: they opposed the Mangold doctrine; they objected to
the horizontal direct effect of the principle of non-discrimination; and they
rejected the notion that national courts could, on their own, set aside national
norms, under Mangold. The Commission urged the Court to stay the course
and confirm Mangold.
































Ms Kücükdeveci won the case. The Court, while mentioning Art. 21 of the
Charter (prohibiting age discrimination) strongly confirmed Mangold, which it
relied on for the proposition that the ‘general principles of EU law prohibits all
discrimination on grounds of age, as given expression in Directive 2000/78.’
The Court found the relevant provision of the Civil Code, dating from 1926,
to be discriminatory and disproportionate, and ordered the referring judge to
set it aside. It answered the key constitutional question as follows:
It is for the national court, hearing proceedings between individuals, to ensure
that the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age, as given
expression in Directive 2000/78, is complied with, disapplying if need be
any contrary provision of national legislation, independently of whether it
makes use of its entitlement . . . to ask the Court of Justice of the European
Union for a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of that principle.
In an unusual move, the Higher Labour Court then issued a final judgement,
setting aside the offending norms, and giving reasons for its decisions,26 a mode
meant to signal the advent of new precedent. The episode reveals constitutional
pluralism in action.
Legislation transposing the Framework Act into German law entered into
force in 2006. German courts have subsequently sent a wave of references to
the ECJ, and these interactions will shape how the German statute will be
implemented. Thus, the developments we have described comprise only the
opening stages – in but one member state – of a long process of institutionaliz-
ing EU non-discrimination law through adjudication.
5. CONCLUSION
As this contribution has shown, the German labour courts willingly perform
their roles as agents of the EU legal order, thereby enhancing the authority of
the ECJ. They have also shown themselves to be more anxious to secure their
own status as rights-protecting courts than to defend the autonomy of the
German constitutional order. As it had done previously in the area of sex equal-
ity, the GFLC succeeded in marginalizing the GFCC, leaving the GFCC to play
catch-up. The age of rights-based, constitutional pluralism in Europe is clearly
upon us.27
Looking ahead, the ECJ’s approach to non-discrimination raises a number of
important questions. A first concerns the relationship between the Court’s
fundamental rights jurisprudence and the Charter of Rights. Under the
Charter, which entered into force on 1 December 2009 (pursuant to the
Lisbon Treaty), lawyers and judges will generate more rights-oriented litigation
and preliminary references, and they will plead and decide cases differently. The
ECJ, for its part, will be able to find rights issues implied in most cases it looks
for them. Thus, there is every reason to expect that rights preoccupations will
gradually come to dominate the Court’s activities. Nonetheless, under Article
51(1) Charter, Charter rights apply to the member states ‘only when they are
































implementing Union law’, whereas the fundamental rights (as general
principles) apply to the member states whenever they act ‘within the scope of
EU law’. Arguably, the latter comprises a broader mandate for judicial
review. It is possible that the Court chose its formulation in Mangold in
anticipation of the Charter’s eventual promulgation, which would provide it
with more reach and flexibility when dealing with references from the national
courts. Today, there is hardly any area of national labour law, for example,
that does not have a significant connection to EU law, and thus it is EU (not
national-constitutional) rights that control. The German labour courts,
we expect, will now aggressively work to construct the Charter for their own
purposes.
In the meantime, litigation under the suite of directives on equality and
non-discrimination, adopted since 2000 (Bell 2011), is exploding. In
Coleman (C-303/06), a case involving equality for the disabled, the UK
argued (as other states have) that the Framework Directive on Employment
Equality lays down only ‘minimum standards’. In his opinion, Advocate-
General Maduro rejected this argument, but only after developing an expansive
notion of equality and non-discrimination linked to the ‘underlying values’ of
‘dignity and personal autonomy’. Under this conception, ‘subtle’ forms of indir-
ect discrimination must also be covered. Maduro’s formulation in Coleman fits
well with the view of Advocate-General Sharpston (in Bartsch, discussed above)
to the effect that the principle of non-discrimination is inherently expansive and
adaptable to changing circumstances. The ECJ sided with Ms Coleman against
the United Kingdom. If adjudicating non-discrimination claims in the EU
means judicial recognition and enforcement of the underlying values of
equality, then Mangold is only a modest but crucial step down the long path
of judicialization through the protection of individual rights.
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NOTES
1 For a recent review of the social science literature on these topics, see Stone Sweet
(2010).
2 In many European legal orders, three such sources – national constitutional rights,
EU fundamental rights, the EU Charter of Rights, and the European Convention
on Human Rights– co-exist and, in some areas, substantively overlap. Individuals
have a choice of which source to plead; and judges have a choice of which right
to enforce.
































3 We take no normative view in this article on whether the constitutional rhetoric
is appropriate, or whether developments in this domain of law are normatively
defensible.
4 Marshall I (152/84); Dori (C-91/92). This gap in protection was partly closed by
the emergence of the doctrine of state liability, holding that national judges
can order state officials to compensate private parties for compliance failures; see
Francovich (C-6 & 9/90); Brasserie du Pecheur (C-46/93 and C-48/93).
5 Jenkins (96/80); Bilka (170/84); Rinner- Kühn (171/88); as consolidated in
Enderby (C-127/92).
6 The lone exception being the United Kingdom.
7 On constitutional pluralism more generally, see Stone Sweet (2009).
8 Bundesarbeitsgericht [1954], BAGE 1, 185.
9 Bundesarbeitsgericht [1957], BAGE 4, 274.
10 Bundesverfassungsgericht [1958], BVerfGE 7, 198.
11 Bundesarbeitsgericht [1956], BAGE 3, 180.
12 Bundesarbeitsgericht [1986], BAGE 53, 161. Körner (2001: 1046) notes that the
GFLC went further than the ECJ, making justification of discriminatory effects
more difficult for employers.
13 Bundesverfassungsgericht [1992], Neue Zeitschrift für Arbeitsrecht 10(5): 213–15.
14 Bundesverfassungsgericht [1997], BVerfGE 97, 35.
15 More generally, German labour law has always been regulated through a style of
relatively autonomous judicial law-making that resembles practices found in the
common law, as well as in ECJ decision-making, which has facilitated these dialo-
gues. We thank an anonymous reviewer for emphasizing this important point.
16 This fact scandalized specialists, including Bauer (2005).
17 Arbeitsgericht München 2004, Neue Zeitschrift für Arbeitsrecht-Rechtsprechungsre-
port 10(1): 43–47.
18 Däubler (2001) argued that the provision violated the Directive, while Koberski
(2005) disagreed.
19 The Court derived the right from ‘various international instruments and . . . the
constitutional traditions common to the Member States’.
20 Including Bauer and Arnold (2006), Hailbronner (2008) and Preis (2006).
21 Bundesverfassungsgericht [1993], BVerfGE 89, 155. In that ruling, the GFCC
warned that it would invalidate any EU act having the effect of depriving
German legislative organs of their control over legal norms created at the EU
level. Private parties thereby possessed the right to plead the ultra vires nature of
Community acts before all German judges, and to bring constitutional complaints
alleging the same to the GFCC.
22 Bundesarbeitsgericht [2006], BAGE 118, 76.
23 Bundesverfassungsgericht [2010], BVerfGE 126, 286. English translation available
online at: www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/rs20100706_2bvr266
106en.html (accessed 7 September 2011).
24 Landesarbeitsgericht Berlin-Brandenburg [2007] found a violation of EU law, Neue
Zeitschrift für Arbeitsrecht-Rechtsprechungsreport 13(1): 17–19, whereas Arbeitsger-
icht Lörrach [2007] did not, Arbeit und Recht 3: 184.
25 From the perspective of the ECJ’s case law on supremacy, the question is a version of
one that has already been decided; see Simmenthal II (106/77). The member states
only formally accepted the ECJ’s doctrine of supremacy in 2007, in Declaration 17
‘Concerning Primacy’. Declarations Annexed to the Final Act of the Intergovernmental
Conference which Adopted the Treaty of Lisbon, available online at: http://eur-lex.
europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:115:0335:0359:EN:PDF
(accessed 7 September 2011).
26 Landesarbeitsgericht Düsseldorf [2010], Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht 31(12): 596.
































27 The evolution of the European Convention on Human Rights, as a body of directly
effective, supra-legislative (if infra-constitutional) rights, has also generated
dynamics that are rapidly consolidating constitutional pluralism as a general, struc-
tural feature of European law (Keller and Stone Sweet 2008: 682–89).
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